The connected uniformly hyperstable sets of a finite game are shown to be precisely the essential components of Nash equilibria.
Equivalence of Games and Strategies. Two strategies of one player are equivalent if they yield every player the same expected payoff for each profile of others' strategies. A pure strategy is redundant if the player has another strategy that is equivalent. From a game G one obtains its reduction G ‫ء‬ by deleting redundant pure strategies until none remain; the reduction is unique (apart from names of pure strategies). Two games are equivalent if their reductions are the same. If is a profile of players' strategies in G then its reduction ‫ء‬ is the profile of equivalent strategies of G ‫ء‬ . For each set C of strategy profiles for game G the corresponding set CЈ for an equivalent game GЈ consists of the profiles of equivalent strategies.
Hyperstability and Uniform Hyperstability.
A closed set C of equilibria of game G is hyperstable if for every neighborhood UЈ of the equivalent set CЈ of equilibria for any equivalent game GЈ there exists a neighborhood VЈ of GЈ such that every game in VЈ has an equilibrium in UЈ. A stronger variant is: A closed set C of equilibria of G is uniformly hyperstable if for every neighborhood U of C there exists ␦ Ͼ 0 such that every ␦-perturbation of every equivalent game GЈ has an equilibrium equivalent to some strategy profile in U. Formulation establishes notation, and then Proof of the Theorem proves the following.
Theorem 1. The connected uniformly hyperstable sets are the essential components of any Nash map of the game.
As mentioned above, essential for some Nash map implies essential for every Nash map of the game. ¶ Theorem 1 is proved in two parts: an essential component is uniformly hyperstable, Theorem 2; a connected uniformly hyperstable set is an essential component, Theorem 3. An implication of Theorem 1 is that a component is uniformly hyperstable iff its topological index is nonzero. Independently, von Schemde (10) establishes this result for two-player outside-option games. Appendices A and B provide technical tools.
Formulation
We consider games with a finite set N of players, ͉N͉ 2. Each player n ʦ N has a finite set S n of pure strategies. Interpret a § To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: rwilson@stanford.edu. ¶ An analog of this theorem (with essentially the same proof) interprets hyperstability as a property of the equivalence class of a set of strategy profiles for the equivalence class of the game; i.e. G‫ء‬ represents the equivalence class of game G and a hyperstable set for G‫ء‬ represents the equivalent hyperstable sets for games equivalent to G‫.ء‬ pure strategy s n as a vertex of player n's simplex ⌺ n ϭ ⌬(S n ) of mixed strategies. The sets of profiles of pure and mixed strategies are S ϭ ͟ n S n and ⌺ ϭ ͟ n ⌺ n . For player n, S Ϫn ϭ ͟ m n S m and ⌺ Ϫn ϭ ͟ m n ⌺ m denote the sets of profiles of others' pure and mixed strategies. Given N and S, each game G is described by its payoff function Ĝ : S 3 ‫ޒ‬ N from profiles of pure strategies to players' payoffs. Thus a game is specified by a point in ‫ޒ‬ SϫN . Let G n and G n be the extensions of Ĝ n from profiles of mixed strategies to player n's expected payoffs from pure and mixed strategies; namely, player n's expected payoffs from his pure strategies are given by G n :
A profile ʦ ⌺ is an equilibrium of G if each player's strategy n is an optimal reply to others' strategies; that is, [ n Ϫ n ]ЈG n () 0 for all n ʦ ⌺ n . Equilibria are characterized as fixed points of a map as follows [Gül, Pearce, and Stacchetti (11) ]. Let r n : ‫ޒ‬ Sn 3 ⌺ n be the piecewise-affine map that retracts each point in ‫ޒ‬ Sn to the point of ⌺ n nearest in Euclidean distance; i.e., r n (z n ) is the unique solution r ʦ ⌺ n to the variational inequality
and define r : Z 3 ⌺ via r(z) n ϭ r n (z n ) for each player n, and
Then is an equilibrium iff ϭ [r ‫ؠ‬ w] (). Hence the equilibria are the fixed points of the map ⌽ ϵ r ‫ؠ‬ w : ⌺ 3 Z 3 ⌺. An equilibrium component is a maximal connected set of equilibria and thus compact. Each component of fixed points of the permuted map F ϵ w ‫ؠ‬ r : Z 3 ⌺ 3 Z is homeomorphic to a corresponding component of the fixed points of ⌽ and their indices agree [Dold (12) ]. In particular, the index is the local degree of the displacement map f ϵ Id Ϫ F used below.
A restricted class of perturbations perturbs a player's payoffs from his pure strategies independently of others' behaviors. For
is an equilibrium of G Q g} be the graph of equilibria over this class of perturbations. Define : E G 3 Z by n (g, ) ϭ n ϩ G n () ϩ g n , and let p 1 : E G 3 Z be the natural projection. Then is a homeomorphism; in particular,
Ϫ1 . Moreover Appendix A shows that map f has degree ϩ1. There exists an orientation of E G such that the local degree of f is the same as the local degree of the projection map p 1 . Hence the local degree of f and thus also the index of a component C of G is the same as the degree of the projection map p 1 on any sufficiently small neighborhood of (0, C) in the graph E G . Appendix A presents an alternative definition of the index that depends only on the best-reply correspondence, which is intrinsic to a game independently of the map characterizing equilibria as fixed points.
As described in the Introduction, a profile ʦ ⌺ for game G induces an equivalent profile ‫ء‬ ʦ ⌺ ‫ء‬ of G's reduction G ‫ء‬ . Let A n be the matrix whose columns are the pure strategies in S n represented as mixed strategies in ⌺ ‫ء‬n . Then ‫ء‬n ϭ A n n and G n () ϭ AЈ n G ‫ء‬ n ( ‫ء‬ ). A profile ʦ ⌺ is an equilibrium of G if and only if the equivalent profile ‫ء‬ ϭ (A n n ) nʦN is an equilibrium of G ‫ء‬ .
Proof of the Theorem
We now prove the two parts of Theorem 1. Theorem 2 extends to the entire class of equivalent games the implication of nonzero index established by Ritzberger (13).
Theorem 2. An equilibrium component is uniformly hyperstable if it is essential.
Proof: Let C be an equilibrium component of game G that is an essential component of a Nash map. Then its index is nonzero [O'Neill (5), McLennan (14) ], say d 0. As shown in Appendix A, the index is invariant to addition of redundant strategies, so we can assume that G is reduced. Let U be an open neighborhood of C in ⌺. We show that there exists ␦ Ͼ 0 such that for each equivalent game G* and each game G * within ␦ of G* there exists an equilibrium of G * equivalent to some profile in U. If necessary by replacing U with a smaller neighborhood, we can assume that the only equilibria in the closure of U are in C. Because no strategy in its boundary ѨU is an equilibrium, ␦ Ͼ 0, where
Let G* be a game whose reduction is G, and let C* be the equilibrium component of G* whose reduction is C. Let E* be the graph of the equilibrium correspondence over the space of games with the same set of strategies as in G*. Let ‫*ނ‬ be the open ball around G* with radius ␦. Let U* ʛ C* be the set of profiles of G* that reduce to profiles in U; note that a profile in ѨU* reduces to a profile in ѨU.
is an open neighborhood of (G*, C*) in the graph. Suppose * ʦ ѨU* and let be the corresponding profile in ѨU. Then there exists a pure strategy s for some player n whose payoff G s n () in G from s against is greater than the payoff G n () from the reduction n of * n by at least ␦ . For a game G * ʦ ‫,*ނ‬ the payoff from s against * is strictly greater than G s n () Ϫ ␦ ͞2 while the payoff from * n against * is strictly less than G n () ϩ ␦ ͞2. Thus, * cannot be an equilibrium of G *. Therefore, G * has no equilibrium in ѨU*. Consequently, the projection map P* : V* 3 ‫*ނ‬ is proper: the inverse image of every compact subset of ‫*ނ‬ under P* is compact. Appendix A shows that the index of C and C* agree. Therefore, by Appendix A, the local degree of G* under P* is d. Because P* is a proper map, this implies that the local degree of each game G * ʦ ‫*ނ‬ is d [Dold (12)]. Therefore the sum of the indices of equilibrium components of G * in U* is d. Since d 0, G * has an equilibrium in U*. Since G* could be any game whose reduction is G and every game G * in its neighborhood ‫*ނ‬ has an equilibrium in U*, C is uniformly hyperstable.
Thus those components with nonzero indices are uniformly hyperstable, and such components exist because the sum of the indices of all components is ϩ1. Now we prove necessity.
Theorem 3. A connected uniformly hyperstable set is an essential component.
Proof: Let C be a closed connected set of equilibria of G and let K be the component containing it. Suppose that Ind(K) ϭ 0 or C K; we show that C is not uniformly hyperstable. Fix a neighborhood U as in the corollary of Appendix A and let ␦ Ͼ 0. We construct an equivalent game G and a perturbation G ␦ of G such that ʈG Ϫ G ␦ ʈ ␦ and the perturbed game G ␦ has no equilibrium equivalent to a strategy profile in U. The construction of G is done in three steps (we are indebted to a reviewer for suggesting a simplification of Step 2).
The best-reply correspondence for game G is BR :
where s ʦ S n is any optimal reply of player n against . A profile is a ␤-reply against if for each n the strategy n is a ␤-reply for player n against .
Step 1: First, we show that without loss of generality we can assume that G satisfies the following property (*): for every neighborhood W of Graph(BR) there exists a map h : ⌺ 3 ⌺ such that:
(ii) For each player n the n-th coordinate map h n of h depends only on ⌺ Ϫn . (iii) h has no fixed points in U.
It suffices to show existence of an equivalent game G* satisfying (*).
Define G* as follows. Player n's pure strategy set is S* n ϭ S n ϫ S nϩ1 , where n ϩ 1 is taken modulo N. For each n, and m ʦ {n, n ϩ 1}, denote by p nm the natural projection from S* n to S m . Then the payoff function from pure strategies for player n is given by G* n (s*) ϭ G n (s), where for each m, s m ϭ p m,m (s* m ). In other words, n's choice of a strategy for n ϩ 1 is payoff irrelevant. Clearly G* is equivalent to G. Let ⌺* n be player n's set of mixed strategies in the game G*. We continue to use p nm to denote the map from ⌺* n to ⌺ m that computes for each mixed strategy * n the induced marginal distribution over S m . Let p : ⌺* 3 ⌺ be the map p(*) ϭ (p 1,1 (* 1 ), . . . , p N,N (* N )); i.e., p computes the payoff-relevant coordinates of *. Finally, let P : ⌺* ϫ ⌺* 3 ⌺ ϫ ⌺ be the map for which P(*, *) ϭ (p(*), p(*)). Use BR* to denote the best-reply correspondence for the game G*. Similarly, C* denotes the component of equilibria of G* equivalent to equilibria in C, and U* denotes the neighborhood corresponding to U.
Fix a neighborhood W* of Graph(BR*). For each Ͼ 0, let W() be the set of those (, ) ʦ ⌺ ϫ ⌺ for which is a -reply to in G. Then the collection {W() ͉ Ͼ 0} is a basis of neighborhoods of the graph of BR. Choose Ͼ 0 such that P Ϫ1 (W()) ʕ W*. By the corollary in Appendix A, there exists a map h : ⌺ 3 ⌺ such that Graph(h) ʚ W() and h has no fixed points in U. Now define the map h* : ⌺* 3 ⌺* as follows: for each n, h* n (*) is the product distribution n (*) ϫ p nϩ1,nϩ1 (* nϩ1 ), where
. By construction, each coordinate map h* n depends only on ⌺* Ϫn . We claim that the graph of h* is contained in W*. To see this, observe first that n (*) is player n's component of the image of (p Ϫn (*),
We finish the proof by showing that h* has no fixed point in U*. Suppose * is a fixed point of h*. Then each * n is a product distribution with p n,nϩ1 (* n ) ϭ p nϩ1,nϩ1 (* nϩ1 ) for all n. Therefore p nn (* n ) ϭ p nn (h* n (*)) ϭ h n (p Ϫn (*), p nϪ1,n (* nϪ1 )) ϭ h n (p(*)) for each player n, which implies that p(*) is a fixed point of h. Since h has no fixed point in U, * ԫ U*.
Step 2: Let I be the interval [0, ␦]. We now show that without loss of generality we can assume that G satisfies the following property (**): there exists a map g : ⌺ 3 I R , where R ϭ ¥ n ͉S n ͉, such that:
(i) For each player n, g n depends only on ⌺ Ϫn .
(ii) No profile ʦ U is an equilibrium of the game G Q g().
As in
Step 1 we prove this by constructing an equivalent game with the property (**). Since the payoff functions are multilinear on the compact set ⌺, there exists a Lipschitz constant M Ͼ 0 such that ʈG n () Ϫ G n ()ʈ Mʈ Ϫ ʈ for all n and , ʦ ⌺. We begin with a preliminary lemma.
Proof of the Lemma: The first result follows directly from the Lipschitz inequality. Let s be an optimal reply for player n to Ј. Then the second result follows by using the Lipschitz inequality along with the inequality: 
Then W is a neighborhood of the graph of BR. From
Step 1 there exists a map h : ⌺ 3 ⌺ such that (i) Graph(h) ʚ W; (ii) for each n, h n depends only on ⌺ Ϫn ; and (iii) h has no fixed point in U.
i is a best reply to i , and is within of i . Therefore, the Lemma implies that i is a 2M-reply against and therefore that is a 3M-reply against .
Fix ␣ Ͼ 0 such that if ʦ U then ʈ Ϫ h()ʈ Ͼ ␣. For each n, let T n be the simplicial complex obtained by taking a sufficiently fine subdivision of ⌺ n such that the diameter of each simplex is less than both and ␣, and let T n be the set of vertices of this simplicial complex. Define T ϭ ͟ n T n . We now define a game G that is equivalent to G, as follows. For each player n the set of pure strategies is T n . The pure strategy t n ʦ T n is a duplicate of the mixed strategy in ⌺ n corresponding to the vertex t n of T n . Since the vertices of ⌺ n belong to T n , G is equivalent to G. Let ⌺ n be the set of mixed strategies of player n in G and let ⌺ ϭ ͟ n ⌺ n . Denote by C and U the sets in ⌺ that are equivalent to C and U, respectively.
For t n ʦ T n , define X(t n ) ʕ ⌺ Ϫn as the projection on to ⌺ Ϫn of the inverse image of the closed star (cf. Appendix B) of t n under the map h n . And let Y(t n ) be the set of Ϫn ʦ ⌺ Ϫn such that ʈt n Ϫ h n ()ʈ 2 [recall that h n () does not depend on n ]. Since the diameter of each simplex of T n is Ͻ , X(t n ) പ Y(t n ) ϭ . Now use Urysohn's lemma to define a function t n :
We now construct a map g : ⌺ 3 I RЈ with the requisite properties by first defining g on ⌺ and then extending it to the whole of ⌺ by letting g( ) be g(), where is the equivalent profile in G. For each n, let f n : ⌺ Ϫn 3 ‫ޒ‬ be the map defined by f( Ϫn ) ϭ max sʦS n G n (s, Ϫn ). For each n,
We first show that g is well defined, i.e. g maps each to a point in I RЈ . Fix n, t n , and . If Ϫn ʦ Y(t n ), then g t n () ϭ 0. If Ϫn ԫ Y(t n ), then ʈt n Ϫ h n ()ʈ 2. Since h n () is a 3M-reply to Ϫn , the Lemma implies that t n is a 5M-reply to Ϫn , i.e., 0 f n ( Ϫn ) Ϫ G n (t n , Ϫn ) 5M. Hence, 0 g t n () 6M ϭ ␦. Thus, g is a well defined map from ⌺ into I RЈ . Obviously the extension of g to the whole of ⌺ also has norm at most ␦. Also, by construction for each n, g n depends only on ⌺ Ϫn .
To finish the proof of this step we show that if ʦ U then is not an equilibrium of G Q g( ). Suppose to the contrary that ʦ U is such an equilibrium and let be the corresponding strategy in ⌺. In the game G Q g( ), consider the payoff that player n gets when he plays a pure strategy t n while the others play according to . If Ϫn ʦ X(t n ), then his payoff is
, which is strictly smaller than f n ( Ϫn ) ϩ M since t n ( Ϫn ) Ͻ 1. Obviously there exists at least one t n such that Ϫn ʦ X(t n ), for instance, any vertex of the simplex of T n that contains h n () in its interior. Thus, the set of optimal replies to for player n, call it TЈ n , is the set of t n 's such that Ϫn ʦ X(t n ). For each t n ʦ TЈ n , there exists a simplex of T n that contains t n and h n (). Hence, the distance between h n () and t n is Ͻ ␣. The support of n being a subset of TЈ n , we then have ʈ n Ϫ h n ()ʈ ␣. Since we are using the l ϱ -distance, ʈ Ϫ h()ʈ ␣, which is impossible. Thus, there does not exist in U that is an equilibrium of G Q g( ).
Step 3: Suppose g : ⌺ 3 I R has the property (**) described in . Construct a simplicial subdivision I of the interval I such that the diameter of each simplex (i.e., a subinterval) is at most . Using the multisimplicial approximation theorem from Appendix B, there exists a simplicial subdivision T n of each ⌺ n , and for each s ʦ S n a multisimplicial approximation g* s : ͉T Ϫn ͉ 3 ͉I͉ of g s that is multilinear on each multisimplex of T Ϫn . Let g* : ⌺ 3 ͉I͉ R be the corresponding multisimplicial map defined by the coordinate maps g* s . By construction, no ʦ U is an equilibrium of G Q g*().
As in Appendix B let P n be the polyhedral complex generated by T n , and let ␥ n : ⌺ n 3 [0, 1] be the associated convex map. For each n let P n be the set of vertices of P n . Given a polyhedron P Ϫn in ͟ m n P m , there exists a multisimplex T Ϫn of T Ϫn that contains it. Since g* is multilinear on each multisimplex, g* is multilinear on each polyhedron.
Consider now the equivalent game G where the strategy set of each player n is the set P n of vertices of the polyhedral complex P n . Let ⌺ n be the set of mixed strategies of player n in the game G . For each player n, let A n be the ͉S n ͉ ϫ ͉P n ͉ matrix, where column p is the mixed strategy vector that corresponds to the vertex p of P n . Then the payoff to player n from a strategy vector ʦ ⌺ is his payoff in G from the profile , where m ϭ A m m for each m. For each n, let B n : P Ϫn 3 I Pn be the map defined by B n (p Ϫn ) ϭ AЈ n g* n (p Ϫn ). Consider now the game G Ј obtained by modifying the payoff functions to the following: for each player n, his payoff from the pure-strategy profile p is G n (p) ϩ B n,p n (p Ϫn ). By construction G Ј is a ␦-perturbation of G . Let c n be the vector in ‫ޒ‬ Pn where the coordinate p of c n is
We claim now that for sufficiently small ␦Ј the game G ␦Ј has no equilibrium in the set Ũ that is the neighborhood equivalent to U of the equilibrium component C for G equivalent to C. Indeed, suppose to the contrary that there is a sequence ␦ k converging to zero and a corresponding sequence k of equilibria of G ␦k that lie in Ũ . For each k let k be the equivalent profile in ⌺. For each k and each player n, if n k ʦ ⌺ n is a mixed strategy such that A n n k ϭ n k then cЈ n n k cЈ n n k . Thus n k solves the linear programming problem min n k ʦ⌺ n cЈ n n k subject to A n n k ϭ n k . Let L n k be the unique polyhedron of P n that contains n k in its interior. Since ␥ n is a convex function, ␥ n ( n k ) ¥ p n ʦP n n,pn k ␥ n (A n,p n ) for all n k ʦ ⌺ n such that A n n k ϭ n k , where A n,p n is the p n th column of A n and n,pn k is the probability that n k assigns to the pure strategy p n . Moreover, the construction of ␥ n ensures that this inequality is strict unless the support of n k is included in L n k . Therefore, the equilibrium strategy n k assigns positive probability only to points in L n k . Now let be a limit of k as ␦ k 2 0 and let be the equivalent mixed strategy. Then is an equilibrium of the game G Ј. Therefore, is an equilibrium of the game G Q b, where b ns ϭ ¥ p Ϫn g* ns (p) ͟ m n m,p m for each n and s ʦ S n . By the arguments in the previous paragraph, there exists for each n a polyhedron P n ‫ؠ‬ ʦ P n such that n assigns positive probability only to points in P n ‫ؠ‬ . Since each g* n is multilinear on the multisimplex T Ϫn that contains P Ϫn ‫ؠ‬ , b ns ϭ g* ns ( Ϫn ). Thus is an equilibrium of G Q g*(), which is a contradiction. Thus, for all sufficiently small ␦Ј the game G ␦Ј has no equilibrium in Ũ .
Thus the connected uniformly hyperstable sets are precisely the essential components as stated in Theorem 1.
where
between the one-point compactifications, call themĒ* and ⌫ , of E* and ⌫, respectively; and p ‫ؠ‬ ⌰ Ϫ1 is homotopic to the identity map on ⌫ . Thus, the map p ‫ؠ‬ ⌰ Ϫ1 has degree ϩ1. We can therefore orient E* such that the projection map p : E* 3 ⌫ has degree 1. Given a game G and a component C of the game, choose a neighborhood U of {(G , g)} ϫ C in the graph that is disjoint from the other components of equilibria of G (viewed as a subset of E*). The degree of C, denoted deg(C), is the local degree of (G , g) under the restriction of p to U. Since ⌰ is the identity on theZ factor, we can also define the degree of C by using Z as the space of games. Indeed given the game G ϭ (G , g), let EЈ G ϭ (gЈ, ) such that ((G , gЈ) , ) belongs to E*. Let Ј : EЈ G 3 Z be the map Ј(gЈ, ) ϭ z, where z is such that ⌰ ((G , gЈ), ) ϭ (G , z) . Then Ј is a homeomorphism between EЈ G and Z and as before we can define the degree of C as the local degree of the projection map from a neighborhood of {g} ϫ C in EЈ whose closure does not contain any other equilibria of the game G. Obviously, these two definitions are equivalent. If we use Ј then the degree of C is just the degree of g under the map fЈ ϵ p ‫ؠ‬ Ј Ϫ1 from a neighborhood V of Ј({g} ϫ C) in Z, where p is the natural projection from EЈ to Z. Letting and f be the maps defined in Formulation, we have Ј({g} ϫ C) ϭ ({0} ϫ C), and f ϭ fЈ Ϫ g. Therefore, the degree of zero under the map f over V is the same as the degree of g under the map fЈ over V. As in Formulation, the degree of zero under the map f over V is the index of the component w(C) of the fixed point set of F, which is the same as the index of C under the GPS map ⌽.
Invariance of Index and Degree. We provide a simple proof by using the index defined by the best-reply correspondence.
Theorem 5. The index of a component of equilibria is invariant under the addition or deletion of redundant strategies.
Proof: Let C be an equilibrium component of game G. It suffices to show that the index of C is invariant under the addition of redundant strategies. Accordingly, for each player n let T n be a finite collection of mixed strategies. Let G* be the game obtained by adding the strategies in T n as pure strategies for n; i.e., n's pure strategy set in G* is S n ഫ T n . Let ⌺* n be his set of mixed strategies. Let BR* be the best-reply correspondence in ⌺*. Let p* : ⌺* 3 ⌺ be the function that maps each mixed strategy in G* to the equivalent mixed strategy in G. Let : ⌺ 3 ⌺* be the inclusion map that sends a point in ⌺ to the corresponding point on the face of ⌺*; precisely, () ϭ *, where * ns ϭ ns for s ʦ S n and nt ϭ 0 for t ʦ T n . Obviously, () ʚ p Ϫ1 () for each ʦ ⌺.
Let C* ϵ p Ϫ1 (C) be the equilibrium component of G* corresponding to C. Let U be an open neighborhood of C whose closure is disjoint from other equilibrium components of G. Let U* ϭ p Ϫ1 (U). Choose a neighborhood W* of the graph of BR* such that the index of C* can be computed as the sum of the indices of the fixed points in U* of any map h* whose graph is contained in W*.
Let W be a neighborhood of the graph of BR such that (,
14, every neighborhood of the graph of BR contains the graph of a function. Therefore, by the definition of Ind BR (C), there exists a map h : ⌺ 3 ⌺ such that (i) the graph of h is contained in W; (ii) h has no fixed points on the boundary of U; and (iii) Ind BR (C) is the index of the map h over U. Define now a map h* : ⌺* 3 ⌺* by h* ϭ ‫ؠ‬ h ‫ؠ‬ p. Then, by construction the graph of h* is contained in W*.
Moreover, h and h* have homeomorphic sets of fixed points. In fact, the fixed points of h* are the image of the fixed points of h under the injective map . Letting h 0 ϭ ‫ؠ‬ h, we have that h ϭ p ‫ؠ‬ h 0 and h* ϭ h 0 ‫ؠ‬ p. Therefore, by the commutativity property of the index [Dold (12) ], the index of the map h : U 3 ⌺ is the same as that of h* : U* 3 ⌺*. Hence Ind BR* (C*) ϭ Ind BR (C).
Appendix B: Multisimplicial Complexes
A Multisimplicial Approximation Theorem. We establish a multilinear version of the simplicial approximation theorem. This result may be known but we found no reference. We begin with some definitions; see Spanier (15) A subdivision of a simplicial complex K is a simplicial complex K* such that each simplex of K* is contained in a simplex of K and each simplex of K is the union of simplices in K*. Obviously ͉K͉ ϭ ͉K*͉. We need the following theorem on simplicial subdivisions for our approximation theorem below (15) . By property (i) vertices of K are mapped to vertices of L. Therefore, for each ʦ ͉K͉, f() is an average of the values at the vertices of K. Since the simplex L is a convex set, the image of the multisimplex K is contained in L. If K is a simplicial complex then Definition 1 coincides with the usual definition of a simplicial map. In this special case the image of a (multi)simplex K under f is a simplex of L, which is not necessarily true in general.
